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THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
CARLOS A. PRIMO BRAGA AND CARSTEN FINK*
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the mid-1980s, policymakers in developed and developing
countries have directed increasing attention to intellectual property
rights (IPRs).1 The globalization of economic activities and the expansion of international transactions involving knowledge-intensive
products have generated much friction around this topic.2 This friction often reflects differences in national approaches toward the protection of IPRs.3 In turn, the various national approaches have fostered a movement toward higher standards of protection at a
worldwide level. Many developing countries, for example, have begun to reform their IPR regimes in response to new international
commitments,4 domestic economic reforms, and external pressures.
* Carlos A. Primo Braga is Manager at infoDev/TechNet, the World Bank; Carsten Fink
is a Consultant at infoDev/TechNet, the World Bank. This Article was prepared for the conference entitled “Public-Private Initiatives After TRIPS: Designing a Global Agenda,” organized by the Duke University School of Law, and held in Brussels, Belgium, from July 16 to 19,
1997. Certain sections of this Article discuss research that was initially conducted for Carlos A.
Primo Braga, International Transactions in Intellectual Property and Developing Countries,
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY MANAGEMENT (special edition on Intellectual
Property Rights and Economic Development) (forthcoming 1999). The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed herein are the authors’ own and should not be attributed to
the World Bank, its Executive Board of Directors, its management, or any of its member countries.
1. See Carlos A. Primo Braga, Trade-Related Intellectual Property Issues: The Uruguay
Round Agreement and Its Economic Implications, in THE URUGUAY ROUND AND THE
DEVELOPING ECONOMIES 381, 381-82 (Will Martin & L. Alan Winters eds., 1995) (published
as World Bank Discussion Paper No. 307) [hereinafter Primo Braga]; see also Carlos A. Primo
Braga & Carsten Fink, The Economic Justifications for the Grant of Intellectual Property
Rights: Patterns of Convergence and Conflict, in PUBLIC POLICY AND GLOBAL TECHNOLOGICAL INTEGRATION 99, 99 (Frederick M. Abbott & David J. Gerber eds., 1997)
[hereinafter Braga & Fink].
2. See Braga & Fink, supra note 1; Primo Braga, supra note 1, at 381-88.
3. See Primo Braga, supra note 1, at 381-88.
4. See, e.g., Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr.
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C,
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This Article reviews the potential implications of stronger IPRs
on foreign direct investment (FDI) flows. Part II provides background on the contemporary debate surrounding the economics of
IPRs. Part III discusses how IPRs may affect FDI decisions, and Part
IV reviews some of the available empirical evidence. The Article
concludes with a discussion of areas in which additional research is
needed, focusing on the perspective of developing countries.

The reform of IPRs is a long-term process and there is reason to
believe that IPRs will become increasingly important for FDI decisions. At the same time, the available empirical evidence does not
conclusively establish the relationship between IPRs and FDI decisions.
II. THE ECONOMICS OF IPRS5
The conventional economic rationale for the protection of IPRs
is often framed in terms of Kenneth Arrow’s seminal work on the incomplete appropriability of knowledge.6 IPRs can be understood as
second-best solutions to the problems created by the “quasi-public
good” nature of knowledge.7 To the extent that IPRs enhance appropriability, they are expected to foster investment in research and
development (R&D) and knowledge creation.8 However, IPRs create a static distortion,9 as they constrain the current consumption of
knowledge by enhancing the market power, or monopolistic practices, of title holders.10 In short, IPRs involve a government-mediated
LEGAL INSTRUMENTS—RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31; 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994)
[hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
5. Part II relies extensively on the two following works: Braga & Fink, supra note 1;
Primo Braga, supra note 1.
6. See Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL
FACTORS 609, 617 (Richard R. Nelson ed., 1962) (“[In] an ideal socialist economy, the reward
for invention would be completely separated from any charge to the users of the information.
In a free enterprise economy, inventive activity is supported by using the invention to create
property rights; precisely to the extent that it is successful, there is an underutilization of the
information.”).
7. See id. at 616-17 (“In the first place, any information obtained, say a new method of
production, should, from the welfare point of view, be available free of charge (apart form the
cost of transmitting information). This insures optimal utilization of the information but of
course provides no incentive for investment in research.”).
8. See id. at 618.
9. “Distortions” are factors causing an economy to depart from Pareto-optimality. See
JOHN BLACK, A DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 131 (1997). The concept of Pareto-optimality is
explained in note 66, infra.
10. See Arrow, supra note 6, at 619-22.
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bargain between the producers of knowledge and society.11
The economics of patent and copyright laws is typically explained in terms of Arrow’s rationale.12 By contrast, the basis for protection of trademarks and industrial designs is more often framed in
terms of incentives for investments in reputation (quality) rather than
for innovation per se.13 Trade secrets, in turn, are rationalized as a
necessary supplement to the patent system by protecting innovations
that do not comply with the strict requirements for patentability of
products and processes.14
In developed economies, the long-term trend underlying IPR
protection reflects a course toward the strengthening of IPRs.15 As
Sidney Winter noted, however, there is no clear theoretical presumption that a movement toward stronger protection standards will categorically enhance welfare.16 In fact, patent claims that are too broad
may restrict future R&D and other innovations, and patent races
may lead to over-investment in R&D.17 In addition, private returns
may exceed social returns as IPR protection increases and inventors
begin to appropriate additional gains in assets that are complementary to the innovation.18 Finally, the increase in static distortions in
the consumption of knowledge due to monopolistic practices may
overcome the dynamic benefits of additional R&D.19
Despite these considerations, there is broad recognition that IPR

11. See id. at 623-25; see also Braga & Fink, supra note 1, at 100; Primo Braga, supra note
1, at 397. For an early discussion of the terms of this “bargain,” see the “monopoly profit incentive” and the “exchange for secrets” theses as presented in Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., An Economic Review of the Patent System, Study No. 15, at 20-25 (Comm. Print 1958) (Fritz
Machlup).
12. See generally Arrow, supra note 6, at 616-22.
13. See, e.g., Gene M. Grossman & Carl Shapiro, Counterfeit-Product Trade, 78 AM.
ECON. REV. 59, 60 (1988); see also Braga & Fink, supra note 1, at 100; Primo Braga, supra note
1, at 397.
14. See Braga & Fink, supra note 1, at 100; Primo Braga, supra note 1, at 398.
15. See Braga & Fink, supra note 1, at 100; Primo Braga, supra note 1, at 398.
16. See, e.g., Sidney Winter, Patents in Complex Contexts: Incentives and Effectiveness, in
OWNING SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL INFORMATION 41, 41 (Vivian Weil & John W. Snapper
eds., 1989).
17. See Braga & Fink, supra note 1, at 101; Primo Braga, supra note 1, at 398.
18. See Braga & Fink, supra note 1, at 101; Primo Braga, supra note 1, at 398; see also
Carlos A. Primo Braga, Guidance from Economic Theory, in STRENGTHENING PROTECTION
OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: A SURVEY OF THE LITERATURE
17, 22-23 (Wolfgang E. Siebeck ed., 1990) [hereinafter Primo Braga, Guidance].
19. See Braga & Fink, supra note 1, at 101; Primo Braga, supra note 1, at 398; see also
Primo Braga, Guidance, supra note 18.
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systems play an important role in the promotion of technological
progress. It is true that other institutional arrangements can foster
the generation of knowledge. The government’s direct production of
knowledge, as well as the private sector’s reliance on subsidies and/or
government procurement to foster R&D activities, illustrate available alternatives.20 However, historical hindsight suggests that market-driven incentives (as exemplified by the proprietary approach)
provide the most effective way to organize economic activities, including the creation of knowledge through R&D.21
Many questions concerning the normative implications of IPR
regimes remain unanswered. For example, is the international trend
toward higher standards of IPR protection improving welfare? What
are the implications of stronger IPRs for trade and FDI flows? Can
developing countries enhance their locational advantages in the
beauty contest for FDI by strengthening their IPR regimes? The
following sections review some of the theoretical aspects of the debate arising out of these issues.
A. The International Dimension
IPRs are territorial in nature. Nations must reach mutual accommodation as their residents seek protection for their works in international markets. The negotiations of the Agreement on TradeRelated Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) in the context of the Uruguay Round constitute the most recent chapter in a
long history of attempts to negotiate the issue of extra-territoriality
as related to IPRs.22 Emerging from these negotiations was the acceptance of minimum standards of protection (not only in terms of
coverage of subject matter and scope of protection, but also with respect to enforcement) and the universal coverage of the agreement
(with special and differential treatment for developing countries limited to generous transition periods).23 TRIPS will promote greater
harmonization of IPR protection than the international community
believed to be feasible a few years ago.24
20. For a discussion of these issues, see Partha Dasgupta & Paul Stoneman, Introduction,
in ECONOMIC POLICY AND TECHNOLOGICAL PERFORMANCE 1, 3 (Partha Dasgupta & Paul
Stoneman eds., 1987).
21. See Braga & Fink, supra note 1, at 101.
22. See Primo Braga, supra note 1, at 381 (explaining that the debate “on trade-related
aspects of intellectual property rights in the GATT can be traced back to the Tokyo Round
(1973-79) of multilateral trade negotiations”).
23. See Braga & Fink, supra note 1, at 101-02; Primo Braga, supra note 1, at 388, 394-95.
24. See Braga & Fink, supra note 1, at 102; Primo Braga, supra note 1, at 405. The TRIPS
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The caveats that apply to the desirability of increasing protection
for IPRs at the national level gain an additional dimension when the
analysis moves to the international domain. If the existing or potential title-holders are predominantly foreigners, strengthened IPR protection raises the possibility of an international rent transfer.25 The
net welfare impact of the reform for the host country will depend on
how local consumers and producers are affected, as well as on the
implications of greater IPR protection for world R&D levels and
composition.26
Various scenarios capture the potential effects of higher standards of IPR protection.27 In a small country with limited production
and innovation capabilities whose IPR regime does not affect world
R&D, higher standards of protection likely will improve welfare as
long as they permit access to products that would otherwise not be
available.28 However, if the country has greater production capabilities (a proxy for its capacity to imitate), but limited innovative capacity (as measured by its R&D basis, for example), higher standards
of protection will likely displace local producers, raise prices, and
transfer rent from local consumers and producers to foreign titleholders, resulting in a negative welfare impact. Over time, however,
improved access to technology and knowledge-intensive products

Agreement leaves its signatories with some flexibility in designing national IPR regimes (for
example, in determining the criteria for patentability, the use of compulsory licenses, or the
regulations regarding parallel imports). Moreover, the TRIPS standards of protection are less
stringent than the standards of protection currently prevailing in developed countries such as
the United States.
25. See Braga & Fink, supra note 1, at 102; Primo Braga, supra note 1, at 405. For example, in 1995, of the approximately 35,400 patents granted in developing countries (excluding the
countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States), more
than 28,000 (or 82.5%) were awarded to foreign residents. For further information, see World
Intellectual Property Organization (visited Nov. 11, 1998) <http://www.wipo.org>.
26. See Braga & Fink, supra note 1, at 102; Primo Braga, supra note 1, at 398.
27. For formal models, see M.K. Berkowitz & Y. Kotowitz, Patent Policy in an Open
Economy, 15 CANADIAN J. ECON. 1, 1-17 (1982); Judith C. Chin & Gene M. Grossman, Intellectual Property Rights and North-South Trade, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ROBERT E. BALDWIN 90, 92-107 (Ronald W. Jones
& Anne O. Krueger eds., 1990); Ishac Diwan & Dani Rodrik, Patents, Appropriate Technology,
and North-South Trade, 30 J. INT’L ECON. 27, 27-47 (1991); Alan V. Deardorff, Welfare Effects
of Global Patent Protection, 59 ECONOMICA 35, 35-51 (1992). For a discussion of the optimal
level of protection in the South, see Claudio R. Frischtak, Harmonization Versus Differentiation, in Intellectual Property Right Regimes, in GLOBAL DIMENSIONS OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 89, 103-05 (Mitchel B. Wallerstein et al.
eds., 1993).
28. See Berkowitz & Kotowitz, supra note 27; see also Chin & Grossman, supra note 27, at
96-99; Deardorff, supra note 27.
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should counterbalance this initial adverse impact. Finally, if the
small country has both well-developed production and innovative capabilities (as in the case of the East Asian newly industrialized
economies), the result will be indeterminate, depending on the elasticity of supply of domestic innovations with respect to IPR protection.29
Alternatively, in a developing country large enough to affect innovation in the North (i.e., developed economic regions), strengthened IPR protection could cause an increase or reorganization of
R&D investments on a global scale. In this case, higher levels of protection in the South (i.e., in the developing world) may reflect a better solution for the world as a whole even if the immediate losses in
the South are greater than the initial benefits for innovators in the
North.30
This brief review underscores the limitations of normative recommendations concerning changes in the rules for IPRs at the world
level. Strengthened IPR protection will have different welfare implications depending on the characteristics of each country. Generalizations can only be made if strong assumptions are adopted. For example, if one assumes that the supply of innovations in the South is
inelastic and that IPR regimes have limited influence on trade, foreign direct investment, and technology transfer, then it follows that
TRIPS is essentially an exercise in rent transfer.31 Opposite assumptions lead to a more optimistic view of the welfare implications of
strengthened IPR regimes for developing countries.32
B. The IPRs-Trade Link
IPRs can influence trade flows. For example, discrepancies
among national IPR regimes generate effects similar to non-tariff
barriers.33 Compared to North-North trade, Northern exporters have

29. See Braga & Fink, supra note 1, at 102; Primo Braga, supra note 1, at 398.
30. See Diwan & Rodrik, supra note 27.
31. See Arvind Subramanian, TRIPs and the Paradigm of the GATT: A Tropical, Temperate View, 13 WORLD ECON. 509, 516 (1990).
32. See Robert M. Sherwood, Why a Uniform Intellectual Property System Makes Sense for
the World, in GLOBAL DIMENSIONS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY 68, 68-88 (Mitchel B. Wallerstein et al. eds., 1993) (explaining that “ideological
arguments against strong intellectual property protection will fade, permitting a fresh examination of its positive role in development”).
33. See Richard Stern, Intellectual Property, in THE URUGUAY ROUND: A HANDBOOK ON
THE MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 198, 202-05 (J. Michael Finger & Andrezej
Olechowski eds., 1987).
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additional costs when exporting to the South if they have to engage in
activities designed to inhibit local imitation. Moreover, the international harmonization of IPR regimes diminishes the transaction costs
of operating in different regulatory environments.
The net impact on trade flows of strengthening protection of
IPRs in the South remains ambiguous. As Keith E. Maskus and Mohan Penubarti revealed, a higher protection level fosters two conflicting effects.34 First, greater protection will enhance the marketpower of the title holder, reducing the elasticity of demand for his or
her products.35 Second, greater protection will expand the net demand for the protected products as imitators are displaced.36 The net
trade result will depend on which effect dominates. If the marketpower effect is more substantial than the market-expansion effect,
trade flows may decrease in the aftermath of the reform. If the opposite occurs, strengthened IPR protection will lead to trade expansion.
In other words, the net trade effect of TRIPS will prove to be an empirical question.37
Several studies estimate the effects of IPRs in econometric models.38 Although the estimation results are specific to the models applied, mounting evidence indicates “that IPRs are indeed traderelated.”39 For example, Maskus and Penubarti suggest that the implementation of TRIPS will create an increase in trade flows.40 Although no precise welfare predictions can yet be derived, marketexpansion appears to dominate market-power effects.
III. IPRS AND FIRMS’ FOREIGN INVESTMENT DECISIONS
In determining the impact that weak or strong protection of
IPRs has on decisions to invest abroad, it is useful to begin with a review of the economic incentives firms have for becoming transnational. The most widely accepted framework in this regard is the so-

34. See Keith E. Maskus & Mohan Penubarti, How Trade-Related are Intellectual Property
Rights?, 39 J. INT’L ECON. 227, 229-30 (1995).
35. See id. at 230; see also Braga & Fink, supra note 1, at 106-07; Primo Braga, supra note
1, at 399.
36. See Maskus & Penubarti, supra note 34, at 230.
37. See Braga & Fink, supra note 1, at 106-07; Primo Braga, supra note 1, at 399.
38. See, e.g., Michael J. Ferrantino, The Effect of Intellectual Property Rights on International Trade and Investment, 129 REV. OF WORLD ECON. 300, 311-29 (1993); Primo Braga, supra note 1, at 381-411; Maskus & Penubarti, supra note 34, at 227-48.
39. Maskus & Penubarti, supra note 34, at 244.
40. See id. at 237-44.
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called “ownership-location-internalization theory” (OLI).41 The OLI
approach begins by stipulating that transnational corporations
(TNCs) possess ownership advantages vis-à-vis local firms in the
form of intangible assets.42 These assets usually take the form of new
technologies, informal know-how shared among employees, specific
organizational skills, reputation for quality, and so forth.43 However,
while ownership advantages are necessary, they are not sufficient for
overseas investment.44 In fact, many firms that possess intangible assets choose to serve foreign markets by arm’s-length trade relationships.45
In order for firms to invest abroad, two further conditions must
be met. First, the foreign country must offer location advantages that
make it more profitable to locate business abroad.46 Location advantages are usually associated with factors such as high transportation
costs and tariffs, low input prices, access to distribution networks, and
local regulatory environments.47 Second, it must be more profitable
for firms to internalize production rather than to sell or license their
intellectual assets to independent local firms in the foreign country.48
Internalization advantages take the form of avoiding transaction
costs with potential licensees, controlling inputs, and protecting quality.49
The OLI framework is useful in identifying the influence of IPR
41. See generally John H. Dunning, Explaining Changing Patterns of International Production: In Defense of Eclectic Theory, 41 OXFORD BULL. ECON. & STAT. 269, 275 (1979)
[hereinafter Dunning, Eclectic Theory]; John H. Dunning, Explaining the International Direct
Investment Position of Countries: Towards a Dynamic or Developmental Approach, 117 REV.
WORLD ECON. 30, 30-33 (1981) [hereinafter Dunning, Developmental Approach].
42. See Dunning, Eclectic Theory, supra note 41; Dunning, Developmental Approach, supra note 41, at 30, 32.
43. See Dunning, Eclectic Theory, supra note 41, at 276; Dunning, Developmental Approach, supra note 41, at 33; James R. Markusen, The Boundaries of Multinational Enterprises
and the Theory of International Trade, J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 1995, at 169, 174.
44. See Dunning, Developmental Approach, supra note 41, at 33.
45. See id. at 31. An example would be a U.S. telecommunications equipment manufacturer that produces mobile telephones (possibly with a patented technology) in the United
States, and exports the phones to Germany. This equipment manufacturer would have an
ownership advantage, but it would not take a foreign investment position.
46. See Dunning, Eclectic Theory, supra note 41; Dunning, Developmental Approach, supra note 41, at 31.
47. See Dunning, Eclectic Theory, supra note 41, at 276; Dunning, Developmental Approach, supra note 41, at 35.
48. See Dunning, Eclectic Theory, supra note 41; Dunning, Developmental Approach, supra note 41, at 31.
49. See Dunning, Eclectic Theory, supra note 41, at 276; Dunning, Developmental Approach, supra note 41, at 35.
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protection on a firm’s decision to invest abroad.50 First, ownership
advantages generally relate the existence of intellectual assets to the
occurrence of foreign investment.51 Of course, only a small share of
intellectual assets are eligible for protection under conventional IPR
systems, and firms may service foreign countries by means other than
FDI.52 However, the ownership paradigm has two direct implications.
On the one hand, firms that create intellectual property are likely to
engage in foreign investment; on the other, IPR policy directly influences firms’ foreign investment decisions by endogenizing their ownership advantages.
Second, the protection of intellectual property can also be interpreted as a location advantage, as IPRs are territorial in nature and
hence differ across national boundaries. As John H. Dunning points
out, in an era of globalization and with the growing mobility of intrafirm intermediate products, governments need to pay special attention to their regulatory environments.53 Different levels of protection
in national IPR regimes may influence where a TNC decides to locate.54 Finally, IPR protection may also influence a firm’s decision to
internalize or externalize its intellectual assets.55
50. The empirical evidence generally supports the OLI approach. See Dunning, Eclectic
Theory, supra note 41; Dunning, Developmental Approach, supra note 41. Firms investing
abroad usually have a high share of skilled workers in addition to high R&D intensity, technology-intensive production processes and product portfolios, and aggressive advertising and marketing strategies. See Markusen, supra note 43, at 174. Hence, the value of transnational companies’ intellectual assets is typically large relative to the market value of the transnational
company. See id. Most transnational companies choose to locate their overseas affiliates in
countries with low labor costs, good infrastructure, and other agglomeration benefits. See
David Wheeler & Ashoka Mody, International Investment Location Decisions: The Case of
U.S. Firms, 33 J. INT’L ECON. 57, 64, 66, 69 (1992). The occurrence of technology licensing
compared to FDI stocks is relatively small. See RICHARD E. CAVES, MULTINATIONAL
ENTERPRISE AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 169 (2d ed. 1996). This is usually attributed to market
failures related to asymmetrical information between both contracting parties. In cases where
arm’s-length licensing does occur, the evidence suggests that TNCs prefer licensing vis-à-vis
foreign investment because of its greater rent extracting potential. See id.
51. See, e.g., Markusen, supra note 43, at 174 (discussing the reasons knowledge-based assets are more likely to give rise to FDI than physical capital assets).
52. In essence, there are two alternatives to FDI in serving a foreign market: exporting to
the market or licensing production to a foreign firm at arm’s length. It should be noted that
often a combination of two or even all three “modes of delivery” occurs. A firm, for example,
could license a technology to a foreign firm in which it has only a minority stake (and thus no
direct management control) and also supply this foreign firm with basic inputs via intra-firm
exports.
53. See John H. Dunning, Re-evaluating the Benefits of Foreign Direct Investment, 3
TRANSNAT’L CORP. 23, 48 (1994).
54. See id. at 45.
55. For example, Michael J. Ferrantino argues that a system of IPRs is necessary to the
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Given the various channels through which IPRs affect FDI, what
is the expected relationship between stronger IPR systems and foreign investment flows—or, to what extent and in which direction are
IPRs FDI-related? Many analysts argue that firms are more likely to
invest in countries with strong protection, since the smaller risk of
imitation leads to a relatively larger net demand for protected products.56 This argument would point to a positive IPRs-FDI link.
Conversely, there are two effects that could justify the inference
that IPRs have a negative influence on foreign investment. First,
stronger IPR protection provides title holders with increased market
power and could, at least theoretically, cause firms to actually divest
and reduce their service to foreign countries.57 Second, higher levels
of protection may cause TNCs to switch their preferred mode of delivery from foreign production to licensing. Michael J. Ferrantino argues that firms prefer foreign investment over licensing in the case of
weak protection because internalized foreign production helps firms
to maintain direct control over their proprietary assets.58
The net effect of higher levels of IPR protection on FDI is thus
theoretically ambiguous. It can be questioned, however, whether
possible market power effects are more than just theoretical artifacts,
and whether arm’s-length technology transfers are significant substitutes for international production. We therefore focus on the thesis
that, on average, stronger IPR regimes are likely to induce higher inward flows of FDI.
So far, the discussion has concentrated on horizontal FDI, where
firms establish plants abroad to produce the same or similar goods
for local or regional markets. A second type of FDI can be classified
as vertical foreign investment, which occurs if plants in different

enforcement of licensing contracts. See Ferrantino, supra note 38, at 300, 303. In contrast,
Julio J. Nogués argues “that the decision to license and transfer technology depends much
more on the legal strength of the licensing agreement and the adaptable capacity of the buyer
to absorb the technology” than on the strength of the IPRs regime. Julio J. Nogués, Social
Costs and Benefits of Introducing Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical Drugs in Developing
Countries, 31 DEVELOPING ECONOMIES 24, 42 (1993).
56. See, e.g., EDWIN MANSFIELD, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION, FOREIGN
DIRECT INVESTMENT, AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 11 (International Finance Corporation
Discussion Paper No. 19, 1994) (noting that research-intensive U.S. firms with easy-to-imitate
products will not make substantial investments in countries with weak IPRs protection).
57. Maskus and Penubarti’s analysis of the IPRs-trade link, discussed in Part II, supra, can
also be applied to exporting firms and their overseas affiliates. See Maskus & Penubarti, supra
note 34, at 227, 229, 244.
58. See Ferrantino, supra note 38, at 303.
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countries produce outputs that serve as inputs in other plants.59 Both
forms of FDI are strongly linked to each other (and to trade flows)
and together form what can be called an “integrated production system.”60 This additional dimension of foreign investment poses the
question of how higher levels of protection affect the composition of
FDI. In other words, what portion of a firm’s production processes is
influenced by IPR protection?
One could argue that without strong protection firms may be
reluctant to invest in stages of production that involve a significant
transfer of proprietary knowledge, such as R&D and technologyintensive manufacturing processes. By contrast, one would expect
IPRs to have less importance with respect to investment in marketing, or sales and distribution outlets. However, the importance of
IPRs regarding the composition of FDI depends to a large extent on
whether firms are able to maintain control over their proprietary assets in the absence of legal protection.61
A further dimension of the IPRs-FDI relationship concerns the
degree of ownership in foreign-owned companies. Foreign firms are
less willing to invest in joint ventures with local companies if they risk
losing their proprietary assets.62 Inversely, Jeong-Yeon Lee and Edwin Mansfield point out that IPRs are likely to be of less importance
in minority investments “because unless a firm has complete control,
it is often unlikely to transfer advanced technology to a foreign affiliate.”63 As above, the importance of IPRs on the degree of foreign
ownership depends on the extent to which the title holder is able to
maintain control over its proprietary assets in the absence of protection.
So far, the analysis has only considered the strategies of single
firms in a partial-equilibrium framework.64 It is also worth consider59. See U.N. CONF. ON TRADE & DEV., WORLD INVESTMENT REP. 1996: INVESTMENT,
TRADE, & INT’L POL’Y ARRANGEMENTS at 99, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/DTCI/32, U.N. Sales No.
E.96.II.A.14 (1996).
60. Id.
61. “Absence of legal protection” refers to both the absence of IPRs and, in countries with
existing IPRs, the inadequate enforcement of those rights.
62. See EDWIN MANSFIELD, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION, DIRECT INVESTMENT, AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 5 (International Finance Corporation Discussion
Paper No. 27, 1995) (presenting data which suggests that firms will not undertake joint ventures
in countries where it is perceived that IPRs protection is weak).
63. Jeong-Yeon Lee & Edwin Mansfield, Intellectual Property Protection and U.S. Foreign
Direct Investment, 78 REV. ECON. & STAT. 181, 185 (1996).
64. Partial-equilibrium analysis is the “examination of resource allocation within a single
market without considering the implications for other markets.” LES SEPLAKI, ATTORNEY’S
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ing broader efficiency aspects in a general-equilibrium setting,65 particularly from a North-South perspective. In this regard, it is useful
to distinguish two important channels. First, how do IPRs affect the
dynamic allocation of resources devoted to the creation of knowledge? And second, how does such protection influence the (static)
international division of labor devoted to the manufacture of protected products? Of course, these two channels are not independent
of each other, since both the knowledge-generating and manufacturing sectors compete for scarce resources.
As for the dynamic allocation of resources devoted to the creation of knowledge, it could be argued that higher protection of IPRs
in the South stimulates R&D investments in the North. Even if this
is the case, it is not clear whether this additional R&D effort is appropriate on aggregate terms or with respect to products of special
relevance to developing countries (e.g., drugs to fight tropical diseases). The relevance of such a proposition remains an empirical
question, but in theory it opens the door for “Pareto-efficient”66 bargains between developed and developing countries.67
As for the static international allocation of resources, depending
on a country’s factor endowments68 and factor intensities69 in production, developing economies may have a comparative advantage70 in
the manufacturing process of protected products (e.g., pharmaceuticals). In the absence of foreign investment and in the presence of
substantial imitation71 in developing economies, stronger protection

DICTIONARY & HANDBOOK OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS 185 (1991).
65. General-equilibrium analysis is “the study of interdependence within the entire price
system in all product and labor markets.” Id. at 109.
66. Pareto optimality or efficiency is defined as the economic state which prevails “when it
is impossible by reallocation of production or consumption activities to make all consumers
[better off] without simultaneously making others worse off; i.e. to make at least one person
better off while making no one worse off.” Id. at 185.
67. See Arvind Subramanian, Putting Some Numbers on the TRIPS Pharmaceutical Debate, 10 INT’L J. TECH. MGMT. 252, 261 (1995).
68. Factor endowment is defined as a “country’s stock of factors of production.” BLACK,
supra note 9, at 170. Factors of production, in turn, are any “resource used in the production of
goods or services.” Id. at 171.
69. Factor intensity is the “relative proportions of various factors of production used in
producing goods and services.” Id. at 170. For example, “[f]or any given set of relative factor
prices, some goods are produced using a lot of labor and little capital: such goods are laborintensive.” Id.
70. “A country has a comparative advantage in producing a good, relative to another
country or the rest of the world, if the relative cost of producing the good, that is, its opportunity cost in terms of other goods forgone, is lower than it is abroad.” Id. at 71.
71. Imitation refers to (i) unauthorized use of protected material in countries with existing
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would relocate production from developing countries to industrialized countries—leading to a potentially inefficient inter-regional allocation of resources. Foreign investment, however, could counter
such inefficiencies as TNCs could locate their manufacturing facilities
in developing countries. Hence, the likely effect of stronger protection would primarily be a change of control towards increased international intra-firm division of labor. One major problem with this
line of reasoning, however, is that the usual gains from trade based
on comparative advantage rely on a perfectly competitive market.
However, markets for protected products are, by definition, imperfectly competitive. Hence, there may be other gains or losses from
trade and foreign investment.72
IV. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
The previous section presented the argument that there are valid
reasons to expect that IPRs are FDI-related. This section reviews
some empirical studies that explore this argument. Empirical evidence comes either from surveys of foreign investors in industrial
countries or from econometric work evaluating the impact of different IPR regimes on a cross-section of countries.
Surveys of firms in the North strongly support a positive IPRsFDI link.73 Mansfield’s analysis, based on data collected from patent
attorneys and executives of major U.S. manufacturing firms, shows
that IPR regimes are relevant for some, but not all types of FDI decisions.74 Not surprisingly, IPR protection was found to be more relevant in making decisions related to investment in R&D facilities than
in decisions related to FDI in sales and distribution outlets.75 Mansfield also found sharp differences in the importance of IPR regimes

IPRs, but inadequate enforcement (in this case imitation is illegal and sometimes referred to as
piracy), or to (ii) the use of material protected by IPRs in foreign countries, but not protected
domestically because of the absence of IPRs.
72. Very little research has been done in this context. An exception is found in a study by
Elhanan Helpman, examining the effects of tighter IPRs in a dynamic two-region, one-product,
one-factor model. See Elhanan Helpman, Innovation, Imitation and Intellectual Property
Rights, 61 ECONOMETRICA 1247 (1993). Helpman evaluates the impact of protection on terms
of trade, production composition, available products, and allocation of consumption over time.
See id. His conclusions depend largely on structural parameters, but in most of the cases he
examines, the Southern region is likely to lose from tighter IPRs, whereas the Northern region
may either gain or lose. See id.
73. See MANSFIELD, supra note 62, at 2.
74. See id.
75. See id. at 2-3.
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in influencing decisions on FDI across industries.76 Companies in the
chemical, pharmaceutical, machinery, and electrical equipment industries reported that IPRs played a major role in their decisions
with respect to investment in joint ventures abroad.77 In contrast,
companies in the transportation equipment, metals, and food industries considered IPR protection to have marginal significance on
FDI.78 Mansfield’s extension of the survey in 1995 to German and
Japanese firms largely confirmed these results.79
Claudio R. Frischtak quotes additional survey evidence from
countries within the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development that identifies IPRs as a relevant variable for FDI decisions.80 But, Frischtak also points out that other considerations—in
essence the overall investment climate of a country—are more important than IPRs for FDI decisions.81 In general, these surveys provide useful insight into the role of IPRs in transnational firms’ strategies; however, the extent to which these surveys give reliable
estimates on the empirical significance of IPRs on overall FDI stocks
and flows is questionable.
Cross-country regression analyses provide additional insights in
identifying the overall significance of IPRs on FDI. Based on Mansfield’s survey results,82 Lee and Mansfield compiled an index of IPRs
protection for sixteen developing and newly industrialized countries,83
attempting to explain U.S. FDI flows in these countries in a multivariate regression analysis.84 The estimation result with regard to the
Mansfield index indicates that countries with higher levels of protection attract significantly higher FDI flows.85 Moreover, Lee and
Mansfield collected data from fourteen major U.S. chemical firms regarding the composition of their foreign investment positions.86 Us76. See id. at 2.
77. See id.
78. See id.
79. See id.
80. See Frischtak, supra note 27, at 89, 100.
81. See id. at 99.
82. See MANSFIELD, supra note 62, at 2.
83. See Lee & Mansfield, supra note 63, at 183; see also infra Appendix.
84. Besides the survey index, Lee and Mansfield’s explanatory variables include a measure of market size, a dummy variable for Mexico, the stock of foreign direct investment, a
measure of the degree of industrialization, and a measure for openness. See Lee & Mansfield,
supra note 63. For an introduction to multivariate regression analysis, see JOHN JOHNSTON,
ECONOMETRIC METHODS (3d ed. 1984).
85. See Lee & Mansfield, supra note 63, at 185-86.
86. See id. at 184
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ing Mansfield’s survey index confined to the chemical industry and
several other regressors, Lee and Mansfield find that the percentage
of a firm’s investment devoted to R&D or to manufacturing intermediate and final products is directly related to the perceived strength
of IPR protection.87
Lee and Mansfield’s analysis, however, can be criticized on two
grounds. First, the IPRs index based on Mansfield’s survey implicitly
includes firms’ perceptions about other factors influencing foreign investment and transfer of technology, such as the presence of potential
imitators.88 Second, Lee and Mansfield’s sample selection is biased
towards countries that have at least some technological capabilities
and in which international disputes over IPRs are common.89 Thus, it
may be that Lee and Mansfield’s results overstate the influence that
the protection of intellectual property has on FDI decisions.
In an earlier study,90 we also relied on data detailing U.S. foreign
investment, but used a larger set of countries and the index of patent
protection developed by Richard T. Rapp and Richard P. Rozek.91
The dependent variables were total assets of U.S. firms for total
manufacturing and certain manufacturing industries.92 In addition to
the Rapp and Rozek index, we used the Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) of the recipient countries and a dummy for Canada and Mexico as explanatory variables.93 The estimation results show a statistically positive influence of stronger IPR regimes to total manufacturing.94 The sectoral results are less robust, although the coefficient on
the Rapp and Rozek index always indicated a positive influence
overall and resulted in a statistically significant influence in the
“primary and fabricated metals” and “electric and electronic equipment” industries.95 These results, however, are tentative because only
two additional explanatory variables were used as controlling variables for other determinants of U.S. foreign investment.96

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

See id. at 185.
See id. at 183; see also infra Appendix.
See Lee & Mansfield, supra note 63, at 182-83.
See Braga & Fink, supra note 1, at 99, 114-15.
See infra Appendix; see also RICHARD T. RAPP & RICHARD P. ROZEK, BENEFITS AND
COSTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 24-25
(National Economic Research Associates Working Paper No. 3, 1990).
92. See Braga & Fink, supra note 1, at 99, 114-15.
93. See id. at 114-15.
94. See id.
95. Id. at 114.
96. See id.
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Fink takes a slightly different approach in examining the impact
of IPRs protection on U.S. multinationals. This study uses a gravitytype model to jointly estimate the effects of stronger protection on
U.S. arm’s-length exports (defined as total U.S. exports less intrafirm exports to overseas affiliates) and overseas sales by U.S. affiliates in forty-two countries.97 The data set is pooled across three
manufacturing industries—chemicals and allied products, nonelectrical machinery, and electric and electronic equipment—and includes industry-specific intercepts.98 Fink’s explanatory variables are
Gross National Product (GNP), GNP per capita, geographic distance,
average tariff rates in each of the three industries, language, and a
dummy variable for both Mexico and Canada.99 The strength of
countries’ IPR regimes is approximated by the index developed by
Walter G. Park and Juan Carlos Ginarte.100
Table 1 presents Fink’s estimation results.101 In Model I, the impact of the Park and Ginarte index is forced to be uniform across the
three manufacturing industries.102 The estimated coefficients on the
index are negative, but statistically insignificant for both arm’s-length
exports and sales by affiliates.103 In Model II, the impact of IPRs is
allowed to differ across the three industries.104 The resulting coefficients are all negative, but only statistically significant in the case of
sales by affiliates in the chemical industry. Fink’s results, therefore,
do not confirm a positive link between IPRs and multinational activity. At best, they suggest a weakly negative relationship.105

97. See Carsten Fink, Intellectual Property Rights and U.S. and German International
Transactions in Manufacturing Industries 1 (Mar. 1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
the Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law).
98. See id. at 2.
99. See id. at 9.
100. See infra Appendix; see also Walter G. Park & Juan Carlos Ginarte, Determinants of
Intellectual Property Rights: A Cross National Study, Table 1 (1996) (unpublished draft paper,
on file with the Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law).
101. See Fink, supra note 97, at 31.
102. See id. at 8.
103. See id. at 13.
104. See id.
105. Ferrantino also investigates the influence of IPRs in U.S. arm’s-length trade, intra-firm
trade, and sales of overseas affiliates in the local market. See Ferrantino, supra note 38, at 303.
Ferrantino introduces IPRs in his model as policy distance variables while using dummies for
membership in the Paris, Berne, and Union for the Protection of Plant Varieties (UPOV) Conventions, and information on the term of patent protection in order to construct proxies for the
strength of the IPRs regime in U.S. trading partners. Ferrantino’s overall results suggest at best
a weak association between IPRs and arm’s-length exports, no influence of IPRs on overseas
affiliates, but significant effects with respect to intra-firm trade. This is interpreted as an indi-
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Fink similarly examines the effects of IPRs on German firms’
export and foreign investment decisions in twenty-five countries.106
Due to the limited data availability, the study uses total German exports and stock of German foreign direct investment as explanatory
variables.107 The data set is pooled across four manufacturing industries: chemicals, non-electrical machinery, electrical engineering, and
transportation equipment. The estimation set-up and explanatory
variables mirror those of the U.S. multinationals.
Estimates of the effects of IPRs on German firms’ exports and
FDI are presented in Table 2.108 As in the U.S. analysis, Model I
forces the impact of IPRs to be uniform across the four industries.
The results show that the estimated coefficient on the IPRs index has
a statistically significant positive impact for total exports, but is close
to zero and insignificant for FDI stock. When the impact of IPRs is
allowed to differ across the four industries in Model II, the resulting
coefficients suggest a significantly positive impact on exports in all
industries except electrical engineering, but no statistically significant
impact on German FDI stock in any of the four industries. These results suggest that in the case of Germany, IPRs in Germany are
trade-related, but not FDI-related.109
A final study reviewed by this Article is Belay Seyoum’s
econometric analysis on the strength of patent, trademark, trade secret, and copyright protection.110 Seyoum’s data is based on questionnaire responses submitted by intellectual property experts from
twenty-seven less-developed, newly industrialized, and developed
countries.111 These responses on the effectiveness of IPRs protection
cation that U.S. transnational corporations prefer to maintain production within U.S. borders
and engage in intra-firm trade, rather than risk a loss of proprietary information by adopting a
more integrated system of production in partner countries that have weaker IPR regimes.
106. See Fink, supra note 97, at 18.
107. The stock of FDI is the sum of past FDI inflows minus depreciation of capital assets.
Investment, whether foreign or domestic, is always a flow measure and relates to a specific time
period (e.g., investment between January 1, 1992 and December 31, 1992). Investment stock
refers to a specific point in time (e.g., investment stock at December 1992).
108. See Fink, supra note 97, at 32-35.
109. See id. at 31-35. In Tables 1 and 2 of this Article, the estimated covariances between
the error terms of the export and FDI regressions indicate the extent to which trade and FDI
are substitutes or complements. In the U.S. case (Table 1), the estimated covariance takes a
small positive value suggesting a weakly complementary relationship between trade and sales
by affiliates. In the German case (Table 2), the estimated covariance takes a value close to
zero suggesting a nearly independent relationship between exports and FDI stock.
110. See Belay Seyoum, The Impact of Intellectual Property Rights on Foreign Direct Investment, COLUM. J. WORLD BUS., Spring 1996, at 50.
111. See id. at 51.
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were combined with four additional explanatory variables (change in
GDP, public investment as a ratio of GDP, external debt to exports,
and exchange rates) to explain total inward flows of foreign direct investment.112 Seyoum’s regression results indicate that trademark,
trade secret, and copyright protection result in a significantly positive
impact on FDI for the total sample size.113 However, when the total
sample is broken down into sub-samples of less-developed countries,
newly industrialized countries, and developed countries, only copyright protection results in a significantly positive impact on FDI.114
We conclude that cross-country regression analyses share common shortcomings. First, most studies evaluate different countries’
IPR regimes by single rankings based on survey results or selected
indicators.115 It is doubtful whether such indices fully capture the
complexities and multiple dimensions of modern IPR systems. Second, the data on bilateral foreign investment and transnational activity discussed in this Article is available only for selected (industrial)
countries. Moreover, the data that is available is often of a highly aggregated nature.116 Although one could argue that almost all FDI
stocks and flows are indirectly affected by IPRs protection, the direct
impact of IPRs protection is likely to be confined to selected FDI
stocks and flows (e.g., foreign investment in pharmaceutical R&D facilities). Finally, IPR regimes are highly correlated with the level of
economic development across countries. Although most of the regression studies account for effects of per-capita GDP and other
variables on foreign investment,117 it is not clear to what extent estimates on the IPRs variables can indeed be attributed to the effects of
intellectual property protection rather than to other developmentrelated effects.
In summary, surveys of foreign investors in industrial countries
generally confirm a positive IPRs link. However, it is not clear how
strong this link is or how important IPRs protection is compared to
other factors influencing foreign direct investment decisions, such as
tax incentives, quality of infrastructure, cultural ties, skills availabil112. See id. at 52.
113. See id. at 53-57.
114. See id.
115. See, e.g., Lee & Mansfield, supra note 63; Ferrantino, supra note 38; RAPP & ROZEK,
supra note 91, app. at 1-4.
116. See, e.g., Lee & Mansfield, supra note 63; Ferrantino, supra note 38; RAPP & ROZEK,
supra note 91, app. at 1-4.
117. See, e.g., Lee & Mansfield, supra note 63; Ferrantino, supra note 38; RAPP & ROZEK,
supra note 91, app. at 1-4.
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ity, and input prices.118 There have been several econometric studies
that have tried to evaluate the effect of IPR regimes on U.S. and
German foreign investment as well as on selected countries’ inward
flows of foreign capital.119 Although some of these studies find a significantly positive impact of higher levels of protection on FDI, limitations in data and estimation set-up suggest that this evidence should
be considered as tentative.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE
RESEARCH
The basic conclusions of this Article can be summarized as follows. First, there is growing evidence that IPRs affect FDI decisions
around the world; empirical evidence of the overall strength of this
effect is not, however, conclusive. Second, although the channels
through which IPRs influence FDI decisions are many and quite
complex—given the interaction between trade, FDI, and technologytransfer decisions—the basic presumption is that countries with
stronger IPR regimes will be in a better position to attract knowledge-related FDI flows.
Developing countries engaged in the process of reforming their
IPR regimes must recognize that changes in substantive laws are just
the first step in this process. Unless adequate resources are committed to the administration and enforcement of IPRs and entrepreneurs
become convinced of the sustainability of these new regimes, IPRs
reforms will fall short of their potential.
Research in this area is still in its infancy. The fact that many
developing countries are now reforming their IPR regimes offers a
unique opportunity for “before” and “after” studies. Moreover, further studies about the linkages between IPRs and the different modes
of knowledge diffusion—trade, FDI, and technology transfer—
should be a priority.

118. See Lee & Mansfield, supra note 63, at 181.
119. See studies cited supra note 115.
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APPENDIX
DIFFERENT MEASURES OF IPRS PROTECTION
With the increasing academic and policy-oriented interest in intellectual property protection, several measures or indices of IPR regimes have emerged in the literature. The first such index was developed by Rapp and Rozek in 1990.120 Rapp and Rozek rated the
patent laws of 157 countries on a scale from zero (for countries without patent laws) to five (for countries with patent laws that fully conform to the minimum standards described in United States Chamber
of Commerce).121 As a measure of the strength of IPR regimes, however, the index is incomplete because it only considers one type of intellectual property, patents, and does not take into account the enforcement of a country’s patent law.
In 1996, Park and Ginarte developed an index that significantly
expanded on the work by Rapp and Rozek.122 The Park and Ginarte
index also graded the IPR regimes of 110 countries on a scale from
zero to five, but provided a more elaborate ranking. To compute a
country’s ranking, Park and Ginarte created five different categories:
coverage, membership in international treaties, loss of protection, enforcement, and duration. For each category, they used several
benchmark criteria (e.g., patentability of pharmaceuticals for extent
of coverage) and computed the share of fulfilled criteria. The unweighted sum of these shares over all categories represented a country’s score. Currently, the Park and Ginarte index constitutes the
most useful index in evaluating how IPRs laws are written “on the
books.”
Because written laws may translate differently into practice (e.g.,
regulations concerning the enforcement and administration of IPRs),
survey evidence may be of guidance. Based on Edwin Mansfield’s
1994 article, Jeong-Yeon Lee and Mansfield compiled an index of
IPRs protection for sixteen developing and newly industrialized
countries.123 As a measure of IPR protection, they used the share of
U.S. firms that report that the IPRs regime is too weak to allow the
investment, transfer, or licensing of technology. An advantage of the
Lee and Mansfield index is its ability to capture aspects of IPR protection, such as corruption or lax enforcement, that are not recorded

120.
121.
122.
123.

See RAPP & ROZEK, supra note 91, app. at 1-4.
See id. at 7.
See Park & Ginarte, supra note 100.
See Lee & Mansfield, supra note 63.

BRAGAFINAL2.DOC

1998]

04/02/99 2:34 PM

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT

183

“on the books.” However, the Lee and Mansfield index is subjective
in character, and may implicitly include the behavior of U.S. firms regarding their strategies to transfer proprietary assets abroad and related conditions in host countries that determine the attractiveness of
receiving U.S. technologies. It is also not clear to which type of intellectual property the survey-based index refers.
In 1997, Robert Sherwood developed a hybrid of an “on the
books” analysis and a survey-based index for eighteen developing
countries.124 Starting from a maximum score of one hundred, the index subtracts points for weakness in each of the following areas: enforceability; administration; treaties; and substantive laws for copyright, patents, trademarks, trade secrets, and life forms. The index
adds up to three points for a country’s strong general commitment to
IPR protection. In computing a country’s ranking, Sherwood relied
on his own examination of the country’s IPR laws and on information
provided by local agents involved in the country’s IPRs system.
Sherwood’s approach probably represents the most comprehensive
means of ranking national IPR regimes. However, similar to the Lee
and Mansfield survey, Sherwood’s index is limited by its subjective
character.
As far as feasible comparisons of country coverage, a strong correlation appears between the Rapp and Rozek index and the Park
and Ginarte index. This correlation can be attributed to the similarity in approaches and reference periods. The Lee and Mansfield index, on the other hand, shows a relatively weaker correlation with
both the Rapp and Rozek index and the Park and Ginarte index. Although one should be careful in interpreting this result because comparisons are based on relatively few observations, different methodological approaches may account for this difference. In this case,
the relatively weaker correlation with the Lee and Mansfield index
would suggest that the practical application of national laws differs to
some extent across countries. Correlations with the Sherwood index
are not meaningful because the index examines the mid-1990s (as
opposed to the late 1980s and early 1990s for other indices), and
many countries included in Sherwood’s study significantly reformed
their IPR regimes in the early 1990s. Finally, the number of common
observations, especially with the Mansfield index, is too small to draw
reliable conclusions.

124. See Robert M. Sherwood, Intellectual Property Systems and Investment Simulation: The
Rating of Systems in Eighteen Developing Countries, 37 IDEA 261, 261 (1997).
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TABLE 1: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND U.S. ARM’S-LENGTH
EXPORTS AND SALES BY OVERSEAS AFFILIATES IN THREE
MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES

Model I

Model II

Dependent Variable

Arm’s

Sales by

Arm’s

Sales by

(in natural logarithms)

Length

Affiliates

Length

Affiliates

Chemicals and allied products

-1.305

-15.957

-1.205

-15.774

(-0.67)

(-5.74)

(-0.60)

(-5.62)

Non-electrical

-0.466

-17.076

-0.290

-18.247

machinery

(-0.23)

(-6.02)

(-0.14)

(-6.14)

Electric and electronic equip-

-1.031

-17.203

-1.124

-17.545

ment

(-0.53)

(-6.14)

(-0.56)

ln(GNP)

0.652

1.427

0.647

(7.23)

(11.09)

(6.98)

-0.300

-0.522

-0.295

(-1.93)

(-2.35)

(-1.84)

0.159

-0.754

0.158

(0.64)

(-2.12)

(0.62)

-0.044

-0.129

-0.043

(-3.01)

(-6.15)

(-2.80)

1.936

-0.397

1.945

(3.57)

(-0.51)

(3.50)

0.618

1.089

0.620

(2.90)

(3.57)

(2.86)

-0.075

-0.319

(-0.49)

(-1.44)

Exports

ln(GNP per capita)

ln(Distance)

Tariff

Border

Language

IPRs

Exports

(-6.18)
1.419
(10.88)
-0.474
(-2.10)
-0.674
(-1.88)
-0.127
(-5.89)
-0.242
(-0.31)
1.061
(3.48)

IPRs * (Chemicals and allied

-0.081

-0.516

products)

(-0.43)

(-1.96)

IPRs * (Non-electrical ma-

-0.017

-0.330

chinery)

(-0.07)

(-1.03)

IPRs * (Electric and electronic

-0.105

-0.051

equipment)

(-0.51)

(-0.17)

Adj. R-sq.

0.644

0.717

0.635

0.718

Obs.

85

85

85

85

F-statistic

17.87

24.68

14.27

20.49

Variance

0.638

1.300

0.654

1.294

Covariance

0.292

0.292

0.302

0.302
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Source: For Table 1 see Fink, supra note 97, at 50-51. (Note: t-statistics in parentheses.)
Data on total exports may be found in the U.N. Comtrade database; local sales of U.S. affiliates
and intra-firm exports to affiliates are provided by the U.S. Department of Commerce; GNP
and GNP per capita are courtesy of the World Bank. Data on geographic distance is from Erzan, Holmes, and Safadi. See REFIK ERZAN ET AL., HOW CHANGES IN THE FORMER CMEA
AREA MAY AFFECT INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN MANUFACTURES (World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 973, 1993). Industry-specific average most-favored-nation tariff
rates were taken from the UNCTAD-TRAINS database. The forty-two represented countries
include: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Denmark, Ecuador,
Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Honduras, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Ireland,
Israel, Italy, Japan, Rep. of Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria,
Norway, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sweden,
Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, United Kingdom, and Venezuela. Forty-one observations were excluded because of limitations in the data from the U.S. Department of Commerce.
The estimation technique used was ordinary least squares regression.
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TABLE 2: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND GERMAN TOTAL
EXPORTS AND FDI STOCKS IN FOUR MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES

Model I

Model II

Dependent Variable

Total

Stock of

Total

Stock of

(in natural logarithms)

Exports

Foreign Direct

Exports

Foreign Direct

Investment

Investment

2.212

-9.864

2.038

-9.797

(1.50)

(-3.84)

(1.37)

(-3.77)

Non-Electrical

2.674

-10.820

2.773

-11.583

Machinery

(1.81)

(-4.21)

(1.87)

(-4.48)

Electrical Engineering

2.094

-9.997

2.462

-9.193

(1.41)

(-3.88)

(1.64)

(-3.51)

Transportation

2.365

-10.374

1.534

-9.318

Equipment

(1.59)

(-4.01)

(1.00)

(-3.48)

ln(GNP)

0.540

0.802

0.545

0.804

(9.75)

(8.32)

(9.93)

(8.42)

-0.353

-0.460

-0.351

-0.496

(-2.92)

(-2.18)

(-2.92)

(-2.37)

-0.472

-0.390

-0.473

-0.388

(-6.83)

(-3.25)

(-6.92)

(-3.26)

-0.034

-0.050

-0.035

-0.052

(-3.41)

(-2.93)

(-3.58)

(-3.06)

-0.070

-0.133

-0.074

-0.121

(-0.30)

(-0.33)

(-0.32)

(-0.30)

0.477

0.886

0.481

0.887

(1.50)

(1.60)

(1.53)

(1.62)

0.324

-0.026

(3.16)

(-0.15)
0.339

0.044

(2.36)

(0.18)

IPRs *

0.250

0.312

(Non-electrical machinery)

(1.74)

(1.24)

IPRs * (Electrical

0.164

-0.194

engineering)

(1.14)

(-0.77)

IPRs * (Transportation

0.539

-0.262

Equipment)

(3.60)

(-1.00)

Chemicals

ln(GNP per capita)
ln(Distance)
Tariff
Border
Language
IPRs
IPRs * (Chemicals)

Adj. R-sq.

0.797

0.560

0.802

0.569

Obs.

96

96

96

96

F-statistic

38.37

13.11

30.56

10.63

Variance

0.294

0.888

0.287

0.872

Covariance

0.072

0.072

0.084

0.084
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Source: For Table 2 see Fink, supra note 97, at 52-53. (Note: t-statistics in parentheses.)
Data on total exports may be found in the U.N. Comtrade database; stocks of German foreign
direct investment are provided by the Deutsche Bundesbank. Data sources on explanatory
variables are the same as in the U.S. case (see Table 1). The tariff rate for Germany’s co-EU
members was set to zero. The twenty-five represented countries include: Argentina, Austria,
Brazil, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Hong Kong, India, Ireland, Italy, Japan,
Rep. of Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Singapore, Spain, Sweden,
Turkey, United Kingdom, and United States. Four observations had to be excluded because of
limitations in the FDI data. The estimation technique used was ordinary least squares regression.

